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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COLONIAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

BY HON. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
United States Senator from Indiana.

Administration is the principle upon which our colonial policy should proceed for a century to come. Wherever we have departed from the idea of administration as such, we have made an error which natural conditions will gradually compel us to correct. Not sudden "self-government" for peoples who have not yet learned the alphabet of liberty; not territorial independence for islands whose ignorant, suspicious and primitive inhabitants, left to themselves, would prey upon one another until they become the inevitable spoil of other powers; not the flimsy application of abstract governmental theories possible only to the most advanced races and which, applied to undeveloped peoples, work out grotesque and fatal results—not anything but the discharge of our great national trust and greater national duty to our wards by common-sense methods will achieve the welfare of our colonies and bring us success in the civilizing work to which we are called. And common sense in the management of our dependencies means practical administration of government until our wards are trained in continuous industry, in orderly liberty and in that reserve and steadiness of character through which alone self-government is possible.

Such administration of government is nature's method for the spread of civilization. Throughout all history administering peoples have appeared. Always these peoples have been the most advanced peoples of their time. These advanced peoples have extended their customs and their culture by the administration of government to less developed peoples. Thus, in the process of the centuries, these backward peoples have evolved those qualities of mind and character and that mode of living called civilization. This is true of the ancient nations—witness the effect of Latin administration, harsh and even cruel as it was, upon the ultimate development and destiny of Gaul and Teuton. It is true of modern

nations—witness the miracle that England has wrought all over the world—a miracle which, upon the page of ultimate history, will be England's chiefest glory. And now this same duty that has come to every people who have reached our present state of enlightenment and power must be performed by the American people in Nature's way, and not in the fantastic manner of sincere but dreaming theorists, on the one hand, or insincere and shallow politicians on the other.

The art of colonial government is not new—it is as old as chronicle itself. When they had reached that period of growth which may be called their national manhood, nearly every people have undergone territorial expansion and extended their rule over the inhabitants of alien lands; and they did not withdraw this rule till their strength began to decline. And when that decadence came, the seeds of civilization planted by their administration of colonies remained, sprouted, grew and finally bore beneficent fruit. In this, as in nearly everything else, the experience of nations duplicates the experience of individual men. No greater truth was ever uttered than this profound sentence of Olive Schreiner—"The eternal analogy holds." Apply this to the lives of men and nations. The child is instructed and guided; little by little he evolves independent powers; then achieves his manhood and performs his life-work, which work is measured precisely by his vigor, his courage and his moral ideals; and finally as age approaches, as the blood cools and heart-beats grow fainter, he gradually stops his activities, reefs the sails of his enterprise, and makes for the harbor of quiet and repose.

This period of colonial administration has been reached by the American nation. That period was inevitable. The Spanish War was only its opportunity. Our rapidly-increasing power determined it; our commercial needs determined it; more than either, geography determined it; and, most of all, our duty to the world as one of its civilizing powers determined it. It was inevitable that, in the end, American control should extend over Cuba, San Domingo, and Porto Rico. It was inevitable that Hawaii—the halfway house of the Pacific—should become American—witness Humboldt's prophecy concerning the Pacific. And Hawaii once American, it was inevitable that further expansion over the

western seas should occur—for it is the genius of our race not to stop forever at any halfway house. The people of our blood never pause midway in the syllogism of events, but go on to its conclusion. And so in our present and future colonial expansion, we shall only be working out the logic of history.

Another thing: none of our possessions will ever be given up until our power has begun to wane, and the days of our decline have fallen upon us. "What we have we hold," is the motto of our blood. Show me an instance where England has set up her permanent dominion over an inferior people which she has withdrawn; an instance where Germany has done the like and withdrawn; an instance where we Americans have done the like and withdrawn. It is not in our blood to retreat from duty.

Cuba is no example; for the Platt amendment established there the most perfect suzerainty in the world, and Cuba was under potential American authority every moment that politicians, for stump speech purposes, were declaiming about our withdrawal and apostrophizing "Cuba Libre." Hawaii is no example, for the dishonorable mistake of withdrawing from those islands has been repaired. No American public man has ever survived resistance to American territorial expansion. No American political party has ever successfully opposed it. The proudest monuments of many of our greatest statesmen have been their championship of this expanding instinct of our blood.

In final history, Jefferson will be remembered chiefly for his Louisiana Purchase, which is now the geographical heart of the Republic. Polk and Taylor would already be forgotten but for the war with Mexico and the imperial dominion our victory gave us. Seward, splendid as his public services were and exalted as his statesmanship was, would be little known to the masses to-day but for his acquisition of Alaska; and McKinley's name would in the record of a century hence have received no more than commonplace mention but for the Spanish conflict, and the bringing of the islands of the sea beneath the folds of our flag.

None of this is accident. There is reason and purpose in it all—that reason and purpose which we who are its present instruments do not comprehend, but which the historic observer of the future will see as clearly as we to-day see the same reason and purpose

in the history of other peoples now far enough in the past to give us perspective and proportion. If any one cherishes the delusion that American government will ever be withdrawn from our possessions, let him consult the religious conviction of this Christian people. Let him find what the American pulpit thinks of such a surrender to non-Christian powers of our duty and opportunity in the Orient. Let him school himself in the missionary spirit of the American masses. Let him learn the views of the millions of young American men and women who weekly gather in Epworth League, Christian Endeavor, Knights of Columbus, and a score of other like societies all over the Republic, concerning the withdrawal of the American flag, and all it means from the Philippines, Hawaii, Porto Rico, or any other spot over which it floats or will hereafter be raised. Let him, above all, consider history, and study our racial instinct. No! our flag will not be lowered anywhere. Our duty of administration of orderly government to weaker peoples will not be abandoned. Where we are we stay. And where nature and events in the future shall direct us to go, there we will go.

This fundamental fact settled, what of the development of our colonial policy? The ruling principle along which that policy must be evolved was clear from the first. I repeat it is the principle of administration. From this principle we have departed somewhat—departed because of the supposed exigencies of party politics; because of the foolish attempts to apply a self-government, which we ourselves have taken a thousand years to work out, to a people that are centuries behind us in development; because of the ignorance of some of our public men, the impatience of others, with the vast but simple duties which our colonial task presents. We have been “playing politics” in the government of dependencies. To these causes are due every departure from the natural principle of administration. And it is from these departures that all our future difficulties will flow.

We have extended “self-government,” so-called, too rapidly in the Philippines. This is admitted by the Philippine Commission itself. In the commission’s last report the commission says:

Undoubtedly, if there has been an error it has not been in the direction of restriction, or rather in the granting of perhaps a larger measure of self-

government than a people absolutely untrained in the exercise of any of the functions of government were prepared for.

The "election" of chiefs of municipalities by the people with power to raise and distribute taxes has too often resulted, according to Mr. Alleyne Ireland, in a diversion of funds from proper purposes and the prostitution of the local police to be the body servants of municipal officers. The "election" of provincial governors was a similar error—both were done too hastily and too soon. The diffusion of power, from the very beginning, in the government of a people so simple was a basic error—we should have waited a couple of decades at least, for in the life of a people a decade is but an hour. This is the unanimous verdict of all careful scientific students who have gone over the ground; and many such have deeply studied the question on the spot. This, too, is the unbroken experience of every nation which has made a success of colonial government. This will delay our ultimate success, but will not prevent it. Another like and larger error will delay it still more; but will not ultimately prevent it. That error is the granting of a native legislature to the Philippine Islands decades before the people were prepared for it. At the very moment when suffrage is being restricted in certain sections of our nation itself, we are bestowing it on Filipinos who have no preparation for or understanding of it.

Earnest attempts were made to create this legislature five years ago. I earnestly opposed it in committee, and with the assistance of Senator Allison, of Iowa, and Senator McComas, of Maryland, two members of the Philippine committee, and under the guidance of that ablest constructive statesman of the last half century, Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut, was able to delay it, until the present time, by the device of requiring a census. Many sincere men thought a legislature wise; others, equally sincere, believed it the performance of our duty to American ideals; but most considered this grave business solely from the view-point of "campaign politics." Men totally ignorant of conditions, and caring absolutely nothing for a statesman-like solution of this great problem were anxious to go to the country and make stump speeches about our grant of self-government to the Filipinos; and similar men in other parties were anxious to make similar stump speeches about our "failure to grant self-government to the Filipinos."

It was clear at that time, as it will be demonstrated in the near future, that a Philippine legislature, elected by a people who have not yet acquired the first elements of orderly industry; ninety-eight per cent of whom cannot read or write any language; the immense majority of whom speak different tongues; and all of whom are easily swayed by brilliant and selfish demagogues, of whom there are many in the archipelago—it was clear five years ago as it will be demonstrated five years from now, that such a legislature will be a hindrance to Philippine progress and the culture spot of dissension and trouble. Not only that, but such a legislature will be the magnet that will draw foreign intrigue to the Philippines, to the recurring embarrassment of the American people. Nothing will be easier, more natural, more inevitable than that unfriendly powers will have their agents in such a legislature. I earnestly hope events may prove that I am wrong about this, and no one will rejoice so much as I if the future shows that I am wrong.

There can be no immediate correction of these mistakes. Events, which are as certain to arrive as the future itself, must and will swing us back to the true policy of colonial administration. Meantime patience and firmness are our words of wisdom. That simple administration is the true principle of colonial policy is proved not only by the universal experience of other nations, but by our own as well. It is a broad statement, but absolutely true, that, with one exception, no such cleansing, uplifting, civilizing work was ever done by any people for another as the American people did for the Cubans under the administration of Leonard Wood; the only record of equal brilliancy is that made by Lord Cromer in Egypt. Practicing simple administration—the power concentrated in the hands of one man *who was responsible to the American people*—General Wood achieved in his regeneration of Cuba what doubters declared to be impossible. We wrought more for the actual liberty of the Cuban people in three years than any similar people ever accomplished by themselves, under any form of foreign government, in half a century.

But what American administration did for Cuba the Cubans themselves destroyed in a time so brief that it seems but a moment as history runs. What American administration builded in a day, the Cubans themselves demolished in a day. If it be said that Span-

ish administration along similar lines failed in both Cuba and the Philippines, and that, therefore, the principle is disproved, the answer is that the Spaniards are no longer a successful administrative race as the English are, or the Germans, or as the American people are coming to be. We have developed and are developing the ablest administrators of all time. Witness those amazing and honest managements of some of our mighty corporations and of some of the continental railroads. Witness the executive ability displayed in our whole business world where the men employed in single giant enterprises and the families dependent upon those men are sufficient in numbers to constitute a government. That this administrative ability which our industrial civilization is developing, is equally able in colonial fields is proved by Winthrop in Porto Rico, by Wood in Cuba, by Taft in the Philippines. Had the management of Philippine affairs been placed exclusively in the hands of that great man, unvexed by the little tricks of partisan politics, his splendid success would have been even greater than it was.

Speaking on the subject of our colonial policy in the Philippines in the Senate of the United States, on January 9, 1900, I said:

Our government must be simple and strong. Simple and strong! The meaning of those two words must be written in every line of Philippine legislation, realized in every act of Philippine administration. A Philippine office in our Department of State; an American Governor-General in Manila with power to meet daily emergencies; possibly an advisory council with no power except that of discussing measures with the Governor-General, which council would be the germ of future legislatures, a school in practical government; American Lieutenant-Governors in each province, with like councils about them; if possible an American resident in each district, and a like council grouped about him, frequent and unannounced visits of provincial governors to the districts of their province; periodical reports to the Governor-General; an American Board of Visitation to make semi-annual trips through the archipelago, without power of suggestion or interference to officials or people, but only to report and recommend to the Philippine office of our State Department; a Philippine civil service with promotion for efficiency; the establishment of import duties on a revenue basis, with such discrimination in favor of American imports as will prevent the cheaper goods of other nations from destroying American trade; a complete reform of local taxation on a just and scientific basis; the minting of abundant money for Philippine and Oriental use; the granting of franchises and concessions upon the theory of developing the resources of the archipelago; the formation of a system of public schools everywhere with compulsory attendance

rigidly enforced; the establishment of the English language throughout the islands, teaching it exclusively in the schools and using it, through interpreters, exclusively in the courts; a simple civil code and a still simpler criminal code, and both common to all the islands except Sulu, Mindanao and Paluan; American judges for all but the smallest offenses, gradual, slow and careful introduction of the best Filipinos into the working machinery of the government; no promise whatever of the franchise until the people have been prepared for it; all this backed by the necessary force to execute it; this outline of government, the situation demands as soon as tranquillity is established. Until then military government is advisable.

We cannot adopt the Dutch method in Java, nor the English method in the Malay states, because both of these systems rest on and operate through the existing governments of hereditary princes, with Dutch or English presidents as advisers. But in the Philippines there are no such hereditary rulers, no such established governments. There is no native machinery of administration except that of the villages. The people have been deprived of the advantages of hereditary native princes, and yet not instructed in any form of regular, just and orderly government.

Neither is a protectorate practicable. If a protectorate leaves the natives to their own methods more than would our direct administration of their government, it would permit the very evils which it is our duty to prevent. If, on the other hand, under a protectorate, we interfere to prevent those evils, we govern as much as if we directly administer the government, but without system or constructive purpose. In either alternative we incur the responsibility of directly governing them ourselves, without any of the benefits to us, to them or to the archipelago, which our direct administration of government throughout the islands would secure.

Even the elemental plan I have outlined will fail in the hands of any but ideal administrators. Spain did not utterly fail in devising—many of her plans were excellent; she failed in administering. Her officials, as a class, were corrupt, indolent, cruel, immoral. They were selected to please a faction in Spain, to placate members of the Cortes, to bribe those whom the government feared. They were seldom selected for their fitness. They were the spawn of government favor and government fear, and therefore of government iniquity.

The men we send to administer civilized government in the Philippines must be themselves the highest examples of our civilization. I use the word examples, for examples, they must be in that word's most absolute sense. They must be men of the world and of affairs, students of their fellow-men, not theorists nor dreamers. They must be brave men, physically as well as morally. They must be as incorruptible as honor, as stainless as purity, men whom no force can frighten, no influence coerce, no money buy. Such men come high even here in America. But they must be had. Better pure military occupation for years, than government by any other quality of administration.

Better abandon this priceless possession, admit ourselves incompetent

to do our part in the world-redeeming work of our imperial race; better now haul down the flag of arduous deeds for civilization and run up the flag of reaction and decay than to apply academic notions of self-government to these children, or attempt their government by any but the most perfect administrators our country can produce. I assert that such administrators can be found.

I repeat that our government and our administrators must be examples. You cannot teach the Filipino by precept. An object lesson is the only lesson he comprehends. He has no conception of pure, orderly, equal, impartial government, under equal laws, justly administered; because he has never seen such a government. He must be shown the simplest results of good government by actual example, in order that he may begin to understand its most elementary principles.

This was said after a most painstaking examination of the situation in nearly all of the larger islands, and after studious investigation of the experience of all other colonial governments. The seven years that have passed since then have confirmed me in these views. That we have the power under the constitution to govern in this way is no longer questioned. The words of the constitution

The congress shall have power to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States

confers this power. The decisions of the supreme court in the Insular Cases so declare; and finally we have actually exercised this power. The question of our power to govern exactly as we please "territory belonging to the United States," to use the exact words of the constitution, is no longer open.

In that same speech I also said:

It would be better to abandon this combined garden and Gibraltar of the Pacific, and count our blood and treasure already spent a profitable loss, than to apply any academic arrangement of self-government to these children. They are not capable of self-government. How could they be? They are not of a self-governing race. They are Orientals, Malays, instructed by Spaniards in the latter's worst estate.

And I say the same thing now. But if these errors, if errors they prove to be, are committed, events alone can correct them, and events will correct them. We will never abandon our opportunity and duty at the gates of the Orient.

But we need not make further mistakes. The keynote of our practical policy from now on should be the development of industrial conditions. It is a fact upon which every student of colonial government is agreed that a people's economic welfare and industrial and financial independence is the bedrock upon which all progress toward self-government must be builded. In our passion for school-house education we have neglected this great truth. The Filipinos, like all backward peoples, need to be taught orderly, continuous labor before everything else. Even as a preparation for self-government they need good roads more than they need school-houses—since it is an historic truism that political progress is based on industrial progress. They need easy and convenient highways over which to communicate with one another, and get the products of their toil to market. They need to be taught the practical benefits of law and order. More money hereafter should be spent on roads and harbors and instruction in modern methods of industry than in an education which unfits so backward a people for actual labor in fields and shops, and equips them only with ambition and ability to be nothing more than mediocre clerks in cities.

The report of the Secretary of Commerce and Police of the Philippine Commission for 1905 says:

It is regrettable that since the American occupation the roads have been gradually falling into disrepair. This is due, it is believed, to the fact that the municipalities have not yet awakened to the responsibility which attaches to them of the maintenance of the roads within their own jurisdiction. Under the American idea of government the maintenance of roads is primarily a municipal affair, varied by a few county and state roads and almost no national roads. In the Philippines these duties have lain with the presidents of the towns, but it is only fair to say that the municipal and provincial receipts applicable to the maintenance of public ways have not been sufficient to maintain good roads, and in fact are very much under the amount necessary to rebuild roads in bad condition, much less to construct new ones.

Of course the application of the American township idea of road construction to a country like the Philippines and a people like the Filipinos, is absurd. It would be comic if it were not serious.

The Philippine Commission most properly recommends an

enlargement of the amount of land which any one man or corporation may hold to at least twenty-five thousand acres of land. This is absolutely right and is the minimum—fifty thousand acres would be far better. As it is now, no man or corporation can hold or operate more than five thousand acres of land. This and other like evils of the land laws which we have provided for the Philippines were the result of “practical politics,” on the one hand, and abstract theory, on the other hand. More than anything else, the Philippines and every similar country need capital and labor. It is impossible for capital to operate small bodies of land profitably in such a country, and therefore capital has refused to invest in the Philippines.

Philippine products must be admitted to this country free of duty. The commission has urged this in every report and Mr. Taft has never ceased demanding it. President Roosevelt has repeatedly asked congress to do this act of simple justice and common sense. We have not done it because the beet sugar interests in two or three states, and tobacco interests in two or three other states have been powerful enough to prevent it. They have prevented it because of a fear that Philippine sugar and tobacco might some time in the distant future hurt their business, for we now import much the larger part of our sugar and tobacco, and of course, if we import them in any event, it is clear that the sugar and tobacco interests cannot be injured at the present time by the free admission of Philippine sugar and tobacco.

Thus the mere fear of some remote future injury was used by politicians, who wished to show their sugar and tobacco constituents that they were “protecting” them, to prevent an act of great national statesmanship and pressing national justice. If our markets were open for Philippine products, we would be buying from our dependencies a part of what we are now buying from foreign countries. The prosperity of our wards would enable them to increase their purchases in all American markets many hundred-fold and their gratitude for this justice would create a spirit in the islands that would be more helpful to our administration of government there than regiments and batteries. All of our dependencies should be thoroughly fortified. Future historians will find it difficult to explain why we, the richest and most practical people, failed to

secure our own possessions against possible attack. It would be done, of course, but for the exigencies of partisan politics which seeks to find an "issue" in every possible direction and which does not hesitate to sacrifice great national interests to immediate party success.

We must look upon these matters in a broad, rational, practical way. Already we have begun to do this. Our provision for the building of railroads in the Philippines is a splendid example of the spirit and purpose which must hereafter control in our colonial statesmanship. An even greater one is the law passed last session providing for a Philippine Agricultural Bank, modeled after the Egyptian Agricultural Bank. The most fascinating page of financial history is that of the career of the Agricultural Bank of Egypt. What it has done for the farming people of that ancient land is almost beyond belief. The Philippine Agricultural Bank will do the same thing for the Philippine farmer.

These two sane measures mark a return to that real statesmanship which was illustrated by Wood's work in Cuba, and Taft's work, when unhindered, in the Philippines. Better still, they illustrate the beginning of a new kind of public man in American public life.

After all, the success of our colonial policy depends upon a new kind of American public man. The time has come when the office of senator or congressman must be filled by informed, courageous, upright and trained legislators who study and solve, with a broad national wisdom, the big problems now increasingly confronting us. The senator or congressman who spends his time distributing patronage, fixing up postoffice deals, arranging political combinations, all for the purpose of his own official perpetuation must go out of American public life. Most men who were raised under the old methods of American politics, whether those men be young in years or aged, and no matter how ably they served in bygone days, are useless in solving these new problems. If such men are old they look upon all new problems which had not appeared when they were in their prime, as no problems at all, and consider them with impatience or refuse to consider them entirely. If such men are still young in years, they have not been trained to careful study or any study of real problems, have not been accus-

tomed to thinking out public questions from the viewpoint of the nation, but only from the viewpoint of the effect which their position upon those questions will have upon their own careers.

The kind of American public man who is now beginning to dominate American affairs is the exact reverse of this. The American public man of the future will be a student of national affairs and of world affairs and will have the student's patience. He will be as practical as a business man and have the business man's gift for the concrete. He will be unselfishly conscientious, never fearing or even considering what the effect his stand upon any public question may have upon his own political career, but considering only the effect which his solution of that question will have upon the Republic and the world. This means of course that the American public man from this day must be not only able and learned, but also as fearless as conscience and as pure as he is fearless. As fast as this quality in public men replaces ignorance, selfishness and narrow views, our colonial policy will develop evenly and wisely and America's work in uplifting the people who have been given into our keeping will be increasingly successful.